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I. Where the current Connecticut Sex Offenders Registration Act merely requires persons 
convicted of an enumerated offense under the statute to register as a "sexual offender" and 
requires state agencies to disclose certain personal information about the sexual offenders to its 
citizens for their safety, are the offenders’ due process rights under the United States 
Constitution satisfied?
II. Given that the Alaska legislature enacted the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act based 
on legislative findings of high incidence of recidivism among former sex offenders, is the Act’s 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
October Term 2002
Connecticut Department of Public Safety, et al.,
Petitioner,
-against- 
John Doe, et al..
Respondents.
Ronald O. Otte and Bruce M. Botelho,
Petitioners,
-against-
John Doe I, et al.,
Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States 
Courts Of Appeals for the Second and the Ninth Circuit
BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
Petitioners, Connecticut Department of Public Safety, et al., and Ronald 0. Otte and 
Bruce M. Botelho, respectfully submit this brief and request that this Court REVERSE the 
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on the due process claim, 
and REVERSE the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on the 
ex post facto claim.
OPINION BLLOW
The opinion of the United Stales Court of Appeals for ilie Second Circuit is reported at 
271 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2001). Appendix D. The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit is reported at 259 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2000). Appendix \i.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVLD
The statutes relevant to the disposition of this case. Conn. Gen. Stai. §§ 54-250-261 
(2001), Alaska Stat. ij 12.63.010 (1994), and Alaska Stat. i; 18.65.087 (1994) are set forth in 
Appendices A, B, and C respectively.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews questions of law dc novo. Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516
(1994).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Preliminary History
1. Due Process Claim.
On November 14, 2000, respondent John Doc filed a class action claim in the 
Connecticut District Court, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging the constitutionality of the 
Connecticut Sex Offender Registration Act (“CT-SORA”) on the grounds that it violated his due 
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 1.) Specifically, 
respondent alleged that petitioners’ enactment and enforcement of CT-SORA deprived him of a 
liberty interest - his reputation combined with the alteration of his status under stale law - 
without notice or a meaningful opportunity to be heard. (J.A. 84.) On March 31,2001, the 
district court granted the respondent’s motion for summary judgment on the due process claim. 
(J.A. 85.) The court determined that the undifferentiated nature of the registry stigmatized
1
non-clangcroLis regislranls by grouping them together with dangerous registrants. (J.A. 25. 85.)
The court also found that the stale statute did not provide any procedure to detennine \s'helher 
respondent is currently dangerous before including him in the registry. (J.A. 25.)
Respondent immediately filed motions for certification of the due process claim class, for 
a declaratory judgment, and either for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief on behalf of 
the class, or in the alternative, for a preliminary injunction in favor of himself (J.A. 85.) On 
May 17, 2001, the district court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting electronic or printed 
dissemination of the Connecticut sex offender registry to the public. (J.A. 85.) On May 18,
2001, the district court granted the motion for class certification and entered a declaratory 
judgment in favor of the due process class. (J.A. 85.)
Petitioners appealed to the Second Circuit on June 5, 2001. (J.A. 102.) The Second 
Circuit affimied the district court’s findings on October 19, 2001, holding that CT-SORA 
N’iolalcs the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. (J.A. 106.) Petitioners filed a 
petition for writ of certiorari, which this Court granted on May 20, 2002. (J.A. 108.)
2. Ex Post Facto Claim.
Respondents John Doe I and John Doe II were convicted of sexually abusing a minor in 1984 
and 1985 respectively, and were released prior to ASORA’s enactment. (J.A. 212-13.) Petitioners 
arc Ronald L. Otte, Commissioner of the Alaska Department of Public Safety, and Bruce M. 
Botelho, Attorney General for the slate of Alaska. (J.A. 139.)
Respondents initiated this suit on June 3, 1994 in the Alaska District Court, alleging that the 
Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act (“ASORA” or “the Act") violated their federal and slate 
constitutional rights. (J.A. 138,213.) Specifically, respondents complained that the Act punished 
them for their past sexual crimes retroactively, in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United
9
States Constitution. (J.A. 112-13.) The district court issued a preliniinar\' injunction requiring 
respondents to register pursuant to ASORA’s requirements, prohibiting public disclosure of their 
registration information, and denying respondents’ request to proceed without revealing their real 
names. (J.A. 213.) Both parties filed cross-motions for summar>'judgment. (J.A. 213.) On March 
31, 1999, the Alaska District Court granted petitioners’ motion for summary judgment on 
respondents’ ex post facto claim, and denied respondents’ cross-motion for summary judgment.
(J.A. 185.)
On August 12, 1999, the district court again denied respondents’ second motion on the ex 
post facto claim, and granted petitioners’cross-motion for summary judgment. (J.A. 185.) The 
district court concluded that ASORA was primarily a regulatory, non-punitive legislation, directed t.' 
protect the public from potentially dangerous sex offenders. (J.A. 51.) According to the district 
court, ASORA did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because its overall effect was non-punitive. 
(J.A. 51.)
Respondents appealed to the Ninth Circuit on August 18, 1999. (J.A. 204.) On April 9,
2001, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that ASORA violated the Ex Post Facto 
Clause. (J.A. 222). The court held that despite the legislature’s non-punitive purpose, ASORA's 
effects were clearly punitive, and limited the Act’s application to only those sex offenders who 
committed crimes after its enactment. (J.A. 221-22.) Petitioners filed for a rehearing en banc on 
August 14, 2001, but the Ninth Circuit denied the petition on August 23, 2001. (J.A. 228.)
Petitioners filed a petition for the writ of certiorari on November 21,2001, which this Court granted:
*
February 19, 2002. (J.A. 228.)
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Statement of Facts
1. Due Process Claim.
A. Legislative History of CT-SQRA.
CT-SORA, a version of "Megan’s Law," requires persons convicted of certain statutorily 
enumerated sexual crimes to register with the State and provide information for disclosure to the 
public. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-250-261 (2001). The statute was enacted to protect the health 
and welfare of the State's children. The most recently amended version of CT-SORA 
requires registration of people convicted for crimes falling within one of the four categories: (1) 
crimes against a victim who is a minor; (2) non-violent sexual offenses; (3) sexually violent 
offenses; and (4) felonies committed for a sexual purpose. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-250(2), (5),
(11), (12), 54-251(a), 54-252(a), 54-254(a).
B. Reuistration Requirements for Offenders.
The extent of the registration requirements under CT-SORA varies depending on the type 
of crime a sexual offender has committed. (J.A. 82.) Within three days of his or her release into 
the community, a person convicted of a crime against a minor or of a nonviolent sexual offense 
must register with the Department of Public Safety (hereinafter, "DPS"), and continue registering 
for ten years. (J.A. 82.) At the sentencing court’s discretion, a person convicted of a felony 
committed for a sexual purpose ean be required to register for ten years as well. (J.A. 82.) A 
person convicted of a sexually violent offense must register for life. (J.A. 82.)
Each registrant must provide the DPS with his or her name, "identifying factors," 
including fingcri^rints, a photograph, and a blood sample for DNA analysis, a criminal record, 
and his or her residence address, which must be verified annually. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54- 
250(3), 54-251(a), 54-252(a), 54-254(a), 54-257(c).
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Certain additional obligations apply to all registrants regardless of their underlying 
conviction. (J.A. 82.) Anyone subject to the law who moves to a new residence must infomi the 
state of his or her new address within five days. Conn. Gen. Stat. 54-25 Ua), 54-252(a), 54- 
254(a). Ifa registrant regularly travels into or temporarily resides in another stale, he or she 
must register with the applicable agency there and comply with whatever additional duties that 
state imposes on sex offenders. Id. Each registrant must abide by the statute's address 
verification requirements by completing and returning to the State within ten days of receipt of a 
verification form. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-257(c). Finally, anyone subject to the law must submit 
to having his or her photograph taken at a specified location whcnc\ cr the Stale so requests, at 
least once every five years. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-251(a), 54-252(a), 54-254(a), 54-257(d). 
Failure to comply with any of these duties constitutes a class D felony, punishable by up to five 
years in prison. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-251(d), 54-252(d), 54-253(c). 54-254(b).
C. Notification Requirements of the DPS.
The statute also obligates the DPS to compile the information gathered in a central 
registry and to share that information with local police departments, slate police troops, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the relevant agencies in other stales in which registrants 
live. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-257(a). The DPS must make the registry available to the public 
during “normal business hours,” and post the registry infomiation on the Inleniel. Conn. Gen. 
Stat. § 54-258(a)(l).
The registry information posted on the website contained the registrant's name, address,
♦
photograph, and physical description. (J.A. 83.) The following statement was added to the first 
page of the Sex Offender Registry website:
The [DPS] has not considered or assessed the specific risk of rc-offcnsc with regard to
any individual prior to his or her inclusion within this registry, and has made no
5
dciemiinaiion lhat any individual included in the registry is currently dangerous.
Individuals included wiiliin the registr>' are included solely by virtue of their conviction 
record and slate law. The main purpose of providing this data on the Internet is to make 
the information more easily available and accessible, not to warn about any specific 
individual. Anyone who uses this infomtation to injure, harass or commit a criminal act 
against any person included in the registry or any other person is subject to criminal 
prosecution.
83-84.) 'file website also contained the message: “This information is made available for 
the purpose of protecting the public.'* (J.A. 84.)
2. Ex Post Facto Claim.
A. Reuistration and Notification Provisions of ASORA.
ASORA requires com icted sex offenders to register in person with local Alaska police 
authorities, provide essential registration infomiation (including the offender’s name, address, place 
of employment, date of birth, type of con\'iction. and driver’s license number), and be fingerprinted 
and photographed. Alaska Slat. § 12.63.010(b) (1994). The registration requirements expire after 
lllieen years upon a sex offender’s discharge in cases of a single offence. Alaska Stat. §§
I 2.63.010(d)( 1), 12.63.020(a)(2) (1994). The registration requirements continue for the offender’s 
life if the offender has been convicted of more than two sex offenses or an aggravated sex offense. 
Alaska Stat. 12.63.010(d)(2), 12.63.020(a)(1) (1994).
The Act also authorizes the dissemination of sex offender information through a public 
registry available at the Alaska Department of Public Safety and via the Department’s Internet site. 
.Alaska Stat. § 18.65.087 (1994). The website directory is searchable by the registrant’s name, 
address, zip code, or city. (J.A. 214.) The Internet site contains the following disclaimer: “This
r
information is made available for the purpose of protecting the public. Anyone who uses this 
information to commit a criminal act against another person is subject to criminal prosecution.”
6
Alaska Department of Public Safety, Sex Offender Reuislration Ccniral Registry 
<http://\v\v\v.dps.slate.ak.us/nSorcr/asp/> (last visited October 27. 2002).
B. ASORA Legislative History and Legislative I'indings.
The Alaska Legislature enacted ASORA based on hearings and testimony that indicated a 
high level of sexual recidivism in the state, 1994 Alaska Scss. L. 41. § 1. At the lime, Alaska's 
child sexual abuse rate was six times the national average, while the sexual assault rate was the 
second highest in the nation. Id. Testimony also indicated an increase of 91% in the rate of rape 
between 1991 and 1993, and that approximately one-fourth of Alaska inmates w'cre sex offenders, 
with 100 sex offenders scheduled for release in 1993. Id. Finally, the Legislature considered studies 
evidencing an extremely high recidivism rate among sex offenders. Id.
Based on the testimony, the Alaska Legislature made the following legislative findings:
(1) sex offenders pose a high risk of re-offending after release from custody;
(2) protecting the public from sex offenders is a primary go\ crnmental interest;
(3) the privacy interest of persons convicted of sex offenses arc less important than the
government’s interest in public safety; and
(4) release of certain information about sex offenders to public agencies and the general
public will assist in protecting public safely.
1994 Alaska Scss. L. 41, § 1.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
CT-SORA’s notification provisions do not sligmali/.e registrants and the registration 
provisions do not materially burden or alter their legal status. In applying the stigma-plus lest set 
forth by this Court in Paul v. Davis, the provisions of the statute do not create a false statement 
that injures the registrant’s reputation because the registry is merely disseminating public 
information, namely the registrant’s convicted offenses. 424 U.S. 693, 710-711 (1976). The 
lower court noted that it is unclear whether the availability of registry infonnation of prior 
convictions stigmatizes registrants. Doc v. Dept, of Public Safety. 271 1 .3d 38, 49 (2d Cir.
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2001). Funhcmiorc, courls analyzing similar sex offender registry' statutes have held that any 
stigma to a registrant's reputation is a direct consequence of his prior convictions rather than the 
iiotincation provisions. Doe v. Kelley. 961 F. Supp. 1105, 1112 (W.D. Mich. 1997); Slate v. 
Cook, 83 Ohio St. 3d 404, 413 (1998).
Moreover, neither CT-SORA’s registration nor notification provisions constitute a “plus" 
factor under the stigma-plus test. Most importantly, the registration provisions do not materially 
burden registrants or alter their legal status because they do not abridge any liberty or property 
interest. A registrant is free to li\ e where he chooses and is not restricted from pursuing any 
activities he could pursue prior to his conviction. Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 474 
(6th C’ir. 1999). Hven assuming that the registration provisions result in some affirmative 
burden, such burdens arc relatively de minimis when promoting the statute’s goal of protecting 
the public. C^ok, 83 Ohio St. 3d at 418. Moreover, the burdens of the notification 
provisions arc imposed on the Department of Public Safety, not the registrant.
Finally, under this Court’s balancing approach as articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge, CT- 
SORA adequately provides due process as required by the Fourteenth Amendment. 424 U.S.
319, 334-335 (1976). First, the statute creates no cognizable private interest that is violated. CT- 
SORA docs not stigmatize registrants because it does not make an initial risk assessment. 
Second, even if registrants have somehow been stigmatized as a result of the registry, there is no 
erroneous deprivation of a private interest under the current procedure. CT-SORA’s registry 
does not overemphasize the threat level of any registrant. In fact, it disavows any determination 
of a registrant’s dangcrousness. Lastly, the stale’s interest in maintaining the current procedures 
of CT-SORA is compelling due to the fiscal and administrative burdens of the alternative. Given 
the lack of any risk-level detennination by the registry, holding a preliminary hearing for all
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registrants who contend that they do not pose a threat would be moot and bottleneck the court 
systems. A balancing of the factors weigh heavily in finding that minimal due process is 
satisfied.
ASORA docs not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United Slates Constitution. Courts 
apply the two-part “intent-effects” test to detemiine whether a particular legislation is punitive, and 
whether it is constitutional under the Ex Post Facto Clause. United States v. Urscry, 518 U.S. 26~.
288 (1996); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346,361 (1997).
ASORA lacks a punitive intent because the provisions of the Act arc primarily regulators in 
nature. As evidenced by Alaska’s legislative findings, the overall text and structure of the Act. and 
the goal of protecting the public from recidivist sex offenders, ASORA was designed to ensure 
public safety and assist local law- enforcement in investigating sex offender crimes. Similar state 
statutes have been held to lack a punitive intent based on the legislative findings. Russell v.
Grcuoire, 124 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 1997); Fcmcdccr v. Haun. 227 F.3d 1244(10thCir. 2000).
More importantly, under this Court’s seven-part balancing test developed in Kennedy v. 
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), the aggregate effect of the notification and registration 
requirements is not punitive. The registration and notification requirements do not result in a clear 
affirmative disability to former sex offenders, can rationally be classified as a regulatory scheme, 
and are not necessarily excessive, given the untargcled nature of Internet notification. Even 
assuming that ASORA’s strict registration requirements and far-reaching notification requirements 
result in some deterrence, the Act still remains primarily a civil measure, intended to foster public 
safety and improved investigation of crimes. Creating an easily accessible sex offender registry- 
enables law enforcement to respond quicker to current sex crimes and narrow their search to specific 
geographic communities.
9
No single factor in the Mendoza-Martinez analysis is dispositive. 372 U.S. at 169. While 
this does not mean that each of the seven factors is to be accorded equal weight, it docs imply that a 
single factor should not be elevated over other factors in significance, as the Ninth Circuit reasoned 
in the opinion below. Doc v. Otte. 259 F.3d 979. 994 {9ih Cir. 2000). In this case, the affiniiativc 
disability, historical treatment, scienter, and the alternative rational purpose factors suggest that the 
effect of the statute is not punitive. Moreover, it is at least unclear whether ASORA promotes 
deterrence and retribution, applies strictly to behavior which is already a crime, or whether it is 
excessive. A simple mathematical balancing of the factors weighs in favor of finding a lack of 
overall punitive effect.
ARGUMENT
J. CONNECTICUT SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from depriving an individual of life, liberty, 
or property without due process of law. U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. In order to claim a 
\ iolation of a liberty or properly interest protected under the Due Process Clause, respondent 
must first demonstrate that stale law recognizes and protects that interest. Paul. 424 U.S. at 710- 
71 1 (1976). Second, respondent must demonstrate that the state seeks to remove or significantly 
alter that protected status. Id.
A. CT-SORA Does Not Violate a Registrant's Liberty or Property Interest Because It
Docs Not Meet the “Stigma Plus” Test.
This Court held in Paul that the interest in reputation alone was neither “liberty'’ nor 
"property” guaranteed against slate deprivation without due process of law. Id. at 712. Known 
as the “Stigma Plus” test, the Court required anyone alleging a due process violation to his 
reputation to demonstrate 1) an utterance of a statement about him that is sufficiently derogatory' 
to injure his reputation and capable of being proven false; and 2) some tangible and material
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state-imposed burden or alteration of his status or of a right in addition to tlic stigmatizing 
siatemcnt, Paul, 424 U.S. at 710-711. Ifboth conditions were met. respondent would be entitled 
to due process to establish whether the implication of the stigma is false. Id
1, CT-SORA docs not satisfy the “Stigma” clement under the test.
As the lower court noted, a “stigma” is a mark or token of infamy, disgrace, or reproach. 
Doc, 271 F.3d at 48. To satisfy the stigma element of his claim, respondent must show a 
stigmatizing slalcmcnl made about him or made under color of law that is capable of being 
proven false. Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 627 (1977).
a. The stigma resulting from the notification provisions of “Megan's 
Law’(s)” is speculative and caused by the registrant's own 
convicted offense rather than dissemination of registry 
information.
The Sixth Circuit in Cutshall held that the Tennessee Sex Offender Registration and 
Monitoring Act (hereinafter, “TSORMA”) did not constitute a sufficiently derogatory utterance. 
193 F.3d at 478-479. Under TSORMA, upon a registrant’s annual verification, the Tennessee 
Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter, “TBl”) w as required to maintain, update and report the 
offender’s registration information immediately to local law enforcement agencies as w-ell as to 
the public, as needed. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-106 (1994). The registrant alleged that TBl's 
adherence to the notification provisions violated his due process rights because it stigmatized 
him and deprived him of his right to employment and privacy by disclosing private matters. 
Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 478. The appellate court rejected these claims, holding that the registrant 
4iad failed to establish that the labeling adversely impacted his employment opportunities. at 
480. The court stated that a “charge that merely makes a [registrant] less attractive to other[s] 
but leaves open a definite range of opportunity docs not constitute a liberty deprivation.” 
Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 479.
II
More cmphaiic than the Cutshall court, the district court in Kelley rejected claims that a
similar notification provision under the Michigan Sex Offenders Registration Act (hereinafter,
“MSORA”) deprived registrants of a protected liberty or property interest. 961 F. Supp. at 1112.
As in CT-SORA and TSORMA, MSORA requires anyone convicted of certain enumerated
crimes to register with the Department of State Police either annually or quarterly for at least
twenty five years, and possibly for life. Mich. Comp. Laws § 28.725 - 28.728 (1999) (emphasis
added). The department is required to make the information available to the public within the
same zip code as the offender. Mich. Comp. Laws § 28.730(2) (1999). The department is also
authorized to disseminate the infomialion to the public through electronic or computerized
means. Mich. Comp. Laws ij 28.730(3) (1999).
The Kelley court stated that the notification “does nothing more than compile truthful,
public information and make it available.’* ^ The court further explained that
[t]o the extent public use of such information may result in damage to plaintiffs' 
reputation or may destabilize their employment and other community relations, 
such effects are purely speculative . . . and . . . would appear to fiow’ most directly 
from plaintiffs’ own convicted misconduct and from private citizens’ reaction 
thereto, and only tangentially from state action.
Id. The Kelley court not only rejected plaintiffs’ claims of stigmatization on the basis that the
information was already public and truthful, but also berated their claims of stigma as mere
uncertainties. \d. Furthcmiorc, the court expressly placed the blame of the stigma on plaintiffs’
own actions rather than the notification provisions of Michigan’s statute. Id
Likewise, the Ohio Supreme Court in Cook analyzed Ohio's version of “Megan’s Law,”
Revised Code Chapter 2950 (hereinafter, “RC 2950"), to detemiine whether its notification
requirements stigmatized its registrants. 83 Ohio St. 3d at 413. RC 2950 requires offenders to
register with the county sheriff Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2950.04 (West 2002). The sheriff must
provide such registration infomiation to certain community members, including neighbors, local
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law enforcement agencies, and officials responsible for the salcly ot children and other potential 
victims. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. ij 2950.1 1(A) (West 2002).
The Cook court held that RC 2950 did not impose a stigma on a convicted offender. S3 
Ohio St. 3d at 413. Like the district court in Kelley, the Ohio Supreme Court explained that the 
“harsh consequences of classification and community notification come not as a direct result of 
the sexual offender law, but instead as a direct societal consequence of the offender’s past 
actions." ^ The court opined the registrant’s own conviction to be the cause of the potential 
stigma rather than RC 2950.
b. CT-SORA’s notification provisions do not disseminate false 
statements or information about registrant^
Similar to Kelley and Cook, respondent’s claim here that the registry stigmati/cs him and
members of his class is without merit. It is questionable whether dissemination of already public
infomiation by the registry would injure respondent’s reputation anymore than his own
conviction. Moreover, like TSORMA in Cutshall, CT-SORA does not limit any opportunities.
such as employment, afforded to respondent. 193 F.3d at 480. CT-SORA simply requires
registration with the DPS and verification of the information occasionally.
2. It is unclear whether the availability of registry information via the 
Internet as required under CT-SORA would stigmatize registrants.
The district court for the District of Columbia found that public notification pursuant to
its Sex Offender and Registration Act (hereinafter, “SORA”) resulted in stigma. Doe v.
Williams, 167 F. Supp. 2d 45, 51(Disl. D.C. 2001). Under SORA, a convicted sex offender must
♦
register annually for at least ten years after release. D.C. Code Ann. i? 22-4()02(a) (2001). All 
registrants are subject to “passive" notification, which includes making registration lists available 
for inspection at police stations and open publication of the registry infomiation on the Internet. 
D.C. Code Ann. § 22-4011(b) (2001). “Active" notification includes “community meetings.
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fiver distribution, plionc calls, door-to-door contacts, electronic notification, direct mailings, and 
media releases." D.C. Code Ann. ^ 22-401 l(b)(l )(A). All registrants are subject to “active" 
notification to law cnforceinent agencies, organizations that deal with vulnerable populations as 
schools, day care centers, youth groups, elderly groups, churches, and to any person with respect 
to which the registrant poses a risk. D.C. Code Ann. § 22-401 l(b)(3){A)-(D).
Registrants in \Villiams challenged SORA’s dissemination of registration information via 
the Intcmct as being unconstitutional. 167 F. Supp. 2d at 51. The court stated that despite the 
accuracy of the offender information in the registry and disclaimer that no risk assessment had 
been made, the rcgistr\' suggested that the offender was currently dangerous. Id.
Although some of the facts here resemble those of Williams, the district court’s logic is 
faultv. Indeed, the lower court here correctly expressed doubt as to whether public dissemination 
of the registr)' implied to readers that every listed person on the registry was currently dangerous. 
Doe, 271 F.3d at 49. Specifically, the lower court stated that the “website disclaimer enforces 
the notion [that the regislr>' is a list of all offenders convicted of covered crimes, not only 
presently dangerous offenders] . . . by implying that the site includes both dangerous ^ non- 
dangcrous offenders." Id. (emphasis added). Also, whereas SORA’s notification provisions 
includes "active" notification of all offenders to certain groups, CT-SORA simply maintains an 
Internet registry, which limits publication of such information only to those who are interested.
("I'-SORA docs not authorize flyer distribution, door-to-door contact, phone calls, direct 
mailings, or media releases which reaches the entire local population, including those who may 
have been previously disinterested in such matters. Therefore, it is unclear whether the website 
would actually stigmatize respondent and injure his reputation.
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CT-SORA is further distinguishable from the statute in ^’iiliams because it eliminates 
any potential stigma of respondent's dangcrousness that may arise from public disclosure. In 
addition to a disclaimer akin to Williams, that no dclenninaiion as to whether they are currentU 
dangerous is made, the website explicitly confirms that respondent and others listed in the 
registry’ arc “included solely by virtue of their conviction record and state law." Doe, 271 F.3d at 
44 (emphasis added). CT-SORA thus negates any notion that respondent is currently dangerous. 
Furthermore, it protects respondent by criminally prosecuting “|a|nyonc who uses this 
information to injure, harass, or commit a criminal act against any person included in the 
registry'." Id. In any event, as posited by the Kelley court, any stigma attaching to a registrant is 
a result of his own conviction rather than state action and any potential damage to his reputation 
is speculative. 961 F. Supp. at 1112.
B. CT-SORA Does Not Satisfy the “Plus" Element Under the Stigma-Plus Test
Because It Docs Not Materially Burden Re.uistrants or Alter Their Legal Status.
Even if respondent established the first element of the stigma-plus test, namely, an 
utterance sufficiently derogatory to injure his reputation, CT-SORA docs not satisfy the “plus" 
factor because no tangible or material burden or alteration of respondent’s rights exists. This 
Court explained that the “plus" element in the stigma plus test was designed to address the 
concern that a broad interpretation of the Due Process Clause could allow mere garden-variety 
defamation alone to implicate a violation of the Fourtcentb Amendment, particularly when state 
law remedies were available. Paul, 424 U.S. at 701. Although the import of the “plus" 
component is somewhat unclear, courts that applied the stigma-plus test to statutes with similar 
provisions to CT-SORA concluded that they were not so onerous as to satisfy the “plus" element. 
Neu v. Corcoran. 869, F.2d 662, 665-670 (2d Cir. 1989).
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For insiancc. ihc Sixlli Circuit in Cutshall held the “plus” factor to be lacking in 
I SORMA. 193 F.3d ai 474. The court stated at the outset: “The Due Process Clause is 
implicated only when state conduct alters a right or status recognized by state law.” Id Under 
the statute’s registration provisions, a convicted sex offender is required to register with the TBI 
once everv' ninety days and within ten days following release, within ten days following a change 
of residence, and within ten days after coming into a municipality or county in which the 
offender temporarily resided or was domiciled. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-103 (1994). All 
offenders are required to register for at least ten years. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-107 (1994).
The court concluded that:
I'fSORM AJ does not impose an affimiative disability or restraint [on the offender].... 
He is free to live where he chooses, come and go as he pleases, and seek any employment 
he wishes. Neither arc the public notification provisions tantamount to imprisonment. 
Under the Act. law enforcement officials may disclose registry infomiation when 
necessary to protect the public. This imposes no restraint whatever upon the activities of 
the registrant.
('utshall. 193 F.3d at 474. In examining the language and intent of the statute, the Cutshall court 
reasoned that TSORMA’s registration requirements were necessar>' to “monitor the whereabouts 
ol'convicted sex offenders.” Id In light of this aim, the court held that the statute “does not 
impose any restrictions on the conduct of the offender akin to incarceration or incapacitation; nor 
does the Act force registrants to confomi their actions in the way that rehabilitative efforts 
might.” Id. at 475. In other words, TSORMA did not impose a material burden on the offender 
or alter his legal status by abridging his rights. In addition, the Sixth Circuit noted that the 
4 'nited Stales Constitution did not provide a right to keep registry information private. Id at 
481. Thus. TSORMA failed to satisfy the “plus” factor of the stigma-plus test because it did not 
implicate registrant’s liberty interest in being free from punishment without due process.
( Litshall, 193 F..3d at 479.
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The Ohio Supreme Court also analyzed RC 2950 in Cook to dciennine whether the 
statute placed a substantial burden on the registrant. 83 Oiiio St. 3d at 413. In applying the 
stignia-plus test, the court noted that
an allegation that the government dissemination of infonnalion or government 
defamation has caused damage to reputation, even with all attendant emotional anguish 
and social stigma, docs not in itself stale a cause of action for violation of a constitutional 
right; infringement of more tangible interests must be alleged as well.
Id. Under RC 2950, the registration provisions of the statute require registrants to provide the
county sheriff with a current home address, employer’s name and address, a photograph, and the
license plate number of each vehicle owned by the offender or registered in his name. Ohio Re\ ,
Code Ann. ij 2950.04. Registrants must verify their address with the local county sheriff at least
annually for ten years. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2950.07(B) (West 2002). Habitual sex offenders
must verify annually for twenty years. Id. Finally, sexual predators must register and verify
their residential address every ninety days for life. Id. Failure to comply with the registration
and verification provisions is a felony. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 295().()6(G)(1) (West 2002).
The Cook court held that RC 2950 did not impose a material burden on a convicted
offender. Specifically, it staled that “[t]hc act of registering docs not restrain the offender in an\
way. Registering may cause some inconvenience for offenders.” 83 Ohio St. 3d at 418. The
court analogized the inconvenience of registration to that of renewing a driver’s license. Id It
held that periodic registration with the sheriff s office was a reasonable measure that allowed law
enforcement officials to remain vigilant against possible recidivism by offenders. Id. at 417.
♦Thus, the inconvenience of registration was deemed a ’V/e minimis administrative requirement.”
Id. at 418. In a similar tone, the Cook court also held the required dissemination of registered
information to neighbors and community officials to be an objectively reasonable measure
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because the burden of dissemination was not imposed on the defendant, but rather on law 
enforcement. 83 Ohio St. 3d at 417-418.
The Ohio Supreme C'ouii affirmed their position in Cook four years later in State v. 
[^avden. 96 Ohio St. 3d 211.215 (2002). Similar to Cook, the Ohio Supreme Court in Hayden 
rc\ isited RC 2950 and held it to adequately satisfy the Due Process Clause under the stigma-plus 
lest. Id The registrant in Havden was subjected to registration and notification requirements 
under RC 2950 without a hearing to detennine his classification. Id. at 211. In staling that the 
statute “is not meant to punish a defendant, but instead, to protect the safety and general welfare 
of the people,” the Hayden court held that the Ohio statute did not meet the “sligma-plus” test 
because the registration and address verification proyisions were “de minimis procedural 
requirements” necessary to achieve the legislative goals of statute. Id. at 214-215. The court 
not only concluded that the registrant did not suffer any bodily restraint as a result of the 
registration requirement imposed on him as a sex offender, but also emphasized the necessity of 
the registration requirements to promote RC 2950’s policy of safely of the community. Id at 
214. In light of the statute’s policy goals, the registration requirements in Hayden were not 
sufficiently burdensome to meet the “plus” standard under the stigma-plus test. Id at 215.
Like Cook and Hayden, the case here presents a version of “Megan’s Law” which 
automatically subjects respondent to registration and notification requirements without an 
opportunity for a hearing on whether he is a dangerous sexual offender or whether he poses a 
threat to the community. Doe, 271 F.3d at 45. However, consistent with the reasoning of the 
( ook court, CT-SORA’s registration requirements are reasonable in light of the aims of the 
statute, and procedurally no more burdensome than the requirements of renewing a license.
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83 Ohio Si. 3d al 417-418. Indeed, the rcgistrv' website contained the message; “This 
infonnation is made available for the purpose of protecting the piiblie." IX)c. 271 F.3d at 45. 
Substantively, the registration and notification requirements under (' I'-SORA arc like those of 
TSORMA in Cutshall. Similar to TSORMA, respondent docs not suffer any bodily restraint by 
complying with the registration requirement under CT-SORA. Doc, 271 r.3d al 43. Overall. 
CT-SORA’s registration and notification provisions arc similar to TSORMA's requirement in 
that respondent’s liberty or property interests are not abridged by the registration requirements. 
Cutshall, 193 F.3d al 475. As in Cutshall, respondent is free to live where he chooses and is not 
restricted from any activities he could pursue prior to his conviction. 193 F.3d at 474. His legal 
status is unaltered. Moreover, as the Cook court mentioned, the burdens under the notification 
and dissemination provision of CT-SORA do not fall on respondent, but rather on the DPS. 83 
Ohio St. 3d at 418. Thus, respondent cannot demonstrate the “plus" factor to satisfy the stigma- 
plus test necessary to establish a violation of the Due Process Clause.
In contrast, an Alabama district court held that the registration provisions under 
Alabama’s Community Notification Act (hereinafter, “ACNA") satisfied the “plus" clement 
under the stigma-plus test. Doe v. Pryor, 61 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1231 (M.D. Ala. 1999). Like 
CT-SORA, ACNA requires offenders to register with law enforcement officials periodically and 
imposes criminal liability for failure to comply with the registration requirements. Id. at 1228.
However, the burden imposed under ACNA is distinguishable from that imposed by 
CT-SORA. Most importantly, in contrast to CT-SORA, ACNA restricts the rights of registrants 
by forbidding residence or employment within 1,000 feel of a school or childcare facility, 
residency with a minor who is not his biological or adoptive child, and prohibiting legal name 
changes. Ala. Code § 15-20-22(d)-(i) (1998). Also, whereas CT-SORA’s minimum duration
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itists only ten years. ACNA's registration requirement for an adult criminal sex offender attaches 
for life. Ala. ('ode ij 15-20-33(1998). Finally, unlike CT-SORA, ACNA requires law 
enforcement officials to notify the community through flyer distribution by hand or by regular 
mail. Ala. Code vj 15-20-21(a)(2) (1998). Local posting of flyers, newspaper publications, and 
Inlcmel postings are optional. Ala. Code § 15-20-22(a) (1998). CT-SORA does not require such 
active dissemination of respondent's infomiation. Instead, it only requires registry availability 
on the Intemei. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-258(a)( 1). Overall, CT-SORA does not operate to restrict 
respondent’s rights such as residency, employment or name change. Doe, 271 F.3d at 43-44. 
Thus, CT-SORA, although similar in operation to ACNA with respect to registration 
requirements and criminal liability for failure to comply, does not alter respondent’s legal status 
through restrictions on his liberties.
Respondent fails to satisfy the stigma-plus test.. He has not established a sufficiently 
derogatory utterance under CT-SORA’s registration requirements. Moreover, he has not 
demonstrated that CT-SORA imposes a tangible burden or alters his legal status. As such, his 
claim that CT-SORA deprives him of due process must fail.
C. Hven if CT-SQRA's Registration and Notification Provisions Deprive Registrants
of Liberty or Property Interests, the Statute Satisfies Minimal Due Process as
Required by the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Mathews, this Court explained that the ‘'fundamental requirement of due process is the 
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful lime and in a meaningful mamier.” 424 U.S. at 333. It 
articulated guidelines courts should consider in determining the minimum level of due process 
required by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 334-335. In particular, the first factor courts must 
consider is whether a private interest, such as a liberty or property right, would be affected by the 
official action. Id Second, courts should analyze the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that 
pri\’ale interest through the procedures used. Id. Finally, the probable value of the state’s
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inlcresl, including the function involved and the fiseal and administrative burdens the allcmaii\ c 
procedural requirement entail, must be balanced against the private interest deprivation.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-335.
In applying the Mathews balancing test laid out by this Court, the district court for the 
Southern District of New York held in Doc v, Pataki that the state’s sex offender registration act 
was inadequate in providing due process to its registrants. 3 F.Supp. 2d 456, 471 (S.D.N.^'.
1998). Under New York’s statute, a registrant was assigned a risk level detennination upon 
release without an opportunity to seek review of the risk level detennination. N.Y. Correction 
Law § 168-1 (McKinney 1996). The Pataki court held that the first factor was met because the 
registrant’s private interest of being stigmatized was substantial. 3 F. Supp. 2d at 471. The court 
reasoned the registration and notification requirements would “affect every aspect of the 
offender’s life.” ^ The second prong of the balancing test was also met because, according to 
the court, the registrant was not afforded a meaningful opportunity to contest his initial risk 
determination. Id. In citing to the Third Circuit, the Pataki court agreed that an "erroneous 
underestimation of an individual’s dangerousness will not necessarily result in harm to protected 
groups .... [However], an overestimation of an individual’s dangcrousness will lead to 
immediate and irreparable hann to the offender.” Id, citing to E.B. v, Vcmicro, 119 F.3d 1077.
1110 (3d Cir. 1997). In analyzing the third prong of the Mathews test, the court concluded that 
the state had a compelling interest to promptly notify its citizens without "the burden of a new
adversary criminal trial... the financial costs of which would be onerous.” Pataki, 3 F. Supp. 2d
♦
at 471. Yet, the Pataki court also held that the slate failed its obligation in ensuring that its 
classification and notification system is both fair and accurate. Id. at 473. Fuiihcnnore, in
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following Vejnicro. Ihc Pala^ court also held that the stale carried the burden of proving the 
facts that supported each risk factor considered in determining the initial risk level assessment.
3 F. Supp. 2d at 473.
Like P^al;u, respondent here is alleging that the registr>’ wrongfully classifies him as 
being dangerous. Doc, 271 F.3dal45. However. CT-SORA is distinguishable from Pataki. 
Here, unlike Pataki. no initial ri.sk assessment of respondent has been performed. This negates 
the existence of the first prong, a violated private interest, entirely. As argued above, there is no 
slate created stigma. Doe. 271 F.3d at 44. The registry website explicitly states that no 
determination has been made as to the dangerousness of the registrants. Id CT-SORA cannot 
violate any private interests because it does not stigmatize registrants anymore than by their own 
convictions.
Even if it is conceded that respondent has identified a private interest that would be
violated by the registration and notification requirements under CT-SORA, the second prong of
the Mathc^vs balancing test is not met. CT-SORA does not provide for any initial risk
assessment that could be deemed an erroneous deprivation of private interest undercurrent
procedure. The website is merely entitled “Sex Offender Registry.” Id at 45. It does not in
anyway suggest that any of the registrants is dangerous or overestimate the level of risk a
registrant poses. M. In fact, the registry clearly stales that registrants have been included solely
by virtue of their convictions. Id Similar to the argument under the first prong, it wholly denies
any attempt to classify listed registrants. Id Respondent’s due process rights under the 
►
l ourtccnth Amendment were met when he was tried and convicted of his sexual offense. Thus, 
there is no more due process required to permit the dissemination of the registration information
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under CT-SORA because ii is included in the registry “solcK' by the virtue of the conviction 
record and slate law." Doe, 271 F.3d at 45 (emphasis added).
Finally, the slate’s interest in minimizing the fiscal and administrative burdens is 
substantial due to the waste of judicial resources. Providing an opportunity for a registrant to 
challenge the state as to the level of risk he poses would be moot because the stale has expressed 
no opinion as to the registrant’s threat level. Doc, 271 F.3d at 44. The stale carries no burden of 
proof because it is not contending that respondent poses a threat or is currently dangerous. Id. 
Because CT-SORA circumvents any registrant classification system, unlike Pataki, there is no 
additional procedural guarantee or safeguarding required under the Due Process Clause.
Under the Mathews balancing test, CT-SORA still comports with the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Even if respondent has identified a cognizable liberty or properiv 
interest that has been deprived as a result of CT-SORA, he cannot demonstrate that either the 
registration or notification provisions under the statute erroneously deprive him of that private 
interest. The state expressly disavows any attempt to dclcmiinc the level of risk each registrant 
poses. Thus, the second element of the balancing test, namely, the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of a private interest, is absent. Finally, in light of the fact that no determination of a 
registrant’s risk of recidivism has been made, any opportunity for respondent to be heard on his 
claim that “he is not a dangerous sexual offender" would be a drain on judicial resources. Thus, 
the state’s interest in promoting judicial efficiency under the third factor is substantial. As such.
respondent’s due process claim must fail.
••
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II. ASORA DOES NOT VIOLATE THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE OF THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITl 'TION BECAUSE IT IS NOT PUNITIVE IN INTENT OR 
EFFECT, AND DOES NOT PUNISH SEX OFFENDERS RETROACTIVELY.
The United Slates Constitution prohibits slates from enacting ex post facto laws.
U.S. Const, art. I, ?? 10. An ex post facto legislation punishes offenders retroactively for acts
u hich were legal at the lime of their commission. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981).
Courts apply the two-part “intent-effects” test to determine whether a particular legislation is
punitive for ex post facto purposes. Ursery, 518 U.S. at 288; Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361. In
applying the test, courts first determine whether the legislature intended the law to be punitive by
analyzing the legislative history and construction of the statute. Russell, 124 F.3d at 1087.
Second, courts consider whether the effect of the statute is so punitive as to negate the non-
punitivc legislative intent. Id. A party challenging the law under the “effects” prong must prove
the punitive effect by “clearest proof.” Id.
A. ASORA Lacks Punitive Leuislative Intent Because It Is Primarily a Regulatory^ 
Scheme.
ASORA was not enacted to punish fomier sex offenders. Rather, the underlying purpose of 
the Act was to protect the public from recidivist sex offenders and assist local law enforcement in 
investigating sex offender crimes. Doe v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979, 986 {9th Cir. 2000). The legislative
history, overall design of the registration and notification scheme, and comparison with similar sex
, ' • ,'j ■■■
offender statutes in other jurisdictions support this conclusion.
1. ASORA’s Legislative History Emphasized Protecting the Public, Not 
Punishment of Fomier Sex Offenders.
In searching for punitive legislative intent, the court must first analyze the legislative history 
and findings of the statute. Russell, 124F.3dat 1087. According to the legislative findings, Alaska 
enacted ASORA to protect the public from recidivist sex offenders. 1994 Alaska Sess. L. 41, § 1.
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Based on testimony and hearings, the Alaska legislature concluded that "sex offenders pose a high 
risk of re-offending after release from custody," and emphasized that '“protecting the public from sc\ 
offenders is a primary governmental interest." 1994 Alaska Scss. 1.. 41, ^ 1. I'he legislature also 
noted that the "release of certain information about sex offenders to public agencies and the genera i 
public will assist in protecting public safety.” Id. This language omits any reference to the 
punishment of fonner sex offenders. Instead, the emphasis is on ensuring public safety through 
dissemination of infonnation about dangerous sex offenders to local agencies and the communii\
In Russell, the court held that a similar Washington statute was primarily a non-punili\ c 
measure. 124 F.3d at 1087. The Washington legislature found that maintaining a sex offender 
registry would aid law enforcement agencies in protecting local communities from sex offenders, 
and that convicted sex offenders often posed a high risk of re-offense. 1990 Wash. Laws, ch. 3, ^ 
401. Based on this legislative history, the Russell court concluded that the Washington registratioii 
law was a non-punitive measure intended to promote public safety. 124 F.3d at 1087.
ASORA’s legislative findings are similar to those of the Washington legislature. This 
suggests that the Alaska legislature did not intend the Act to be punitive. Sec 1994 Alaska Scss 
L. 41, § 1. Like the Washington sex offender registration law, ASORA’s legislative historx' 
stresses the high probability of re-offense by fonner sex offenders and the importance of 
informing the general public and local enforcement agencies about newly released sex offenders 
ASORA’s legislative history presents strong evidence that the Alaska legislature lacked a 
punitive intent in constructing its sex offender registration and notification scheme. Rather than 
emphasizing punishment, the legislative testimony and analysis focused on the social risk 
presented by convicted sex offenders and sought to limit the danger to the public via the 
registration and notification requirements. Ottc, 259 F.3d at 986. A recent analysis of ASORA
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hy ihe Alaska Appellate Couii concluded that the Alaska legislature designed the Act to protect 
the public through the collection and release ofinfoimation about sex offenders, and to address 
the problem of recidivism among fomier sex offenders. Patterson v. Alaska, 985 P.2d 1007,
1011*13 (Alaska Cl. App. 1999).
2. The overall design of ASORA’s registration and notification provisions 
is regulator)' and administrative.
The text and overall design of the registration provisions are also relevant in ascertaining 
the legislative intent. I^sseM, 124 F.3d at 1087. The Washington registration law required 
registrants to provide their name, address, dale and place of birth, place of employment, crime of 
conviction, dale and place of conviction, aliases used, photograph, fingerprints, and social 
security number to the local sheriff. Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.130(I)-(2) (2002). The sex 
offender had to notify the local siicriff by written notice of any address change within fourteen 
days before moving. Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.130(4) (2002).
The court reasoned that the registration provisions were not excessive because only 
cs.scnlial personal infonnation such as his name, social security number, address, and place of 
employment was required. Russell. 124 F.3d at 1087. The registration requirements did not 
restrict the offender’s movement, but only mandated that he notify the sheriff about a potential 
address change. \± Given the text and overall design of the Washington registration provisions, 
the Russell court held that the statute focused on monitoring the registrant’s location, rather than 
restricting the his movements or burdening him with excessive registration requirements. Id at 
088.
The Russell court also noted that the text and overall design on the Washington 
notification provisions did not evidence a punitive legislative intent. Id at 1090. The court 
stressed that disclosure occurs only “when the release of the infomiation is necessary for public
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prolection,” and that it helps the local community prepare for the release of sex offenders.
RusselK 124 F.3d at 1090. The court pointed to the Washington legislative findings, which 
emphasized the informational exchange among law enforcement agencies, public safety, and 
effective operation of government via release of the sex offender registry. Id
The overall structure of ASORA is similar to Washington’s sex offender registration law. 
Similar to the Washington statute, ASORA also requires sex offenders to provide their name, 
address, place of employment, fingerprints, and photograph to local police authorities. Alaska 
Stat. § 12.63.010(b) (1994). However, ASORA also requires registration in person. Alaska Stat. 
§ 12.63.010(c) (1994). That distinction does not differentiate ASORA’s registration provisions 
from the Washington statute sufficiently. In a New York sex offender registration statute, the 
requirement to register in person every ninety days was held to be not sufficiently cumbersome 
to “transfonn an otherwise non-punitive measure into a punitive one." Doc v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 
1263, 1285 (2d Cir. 1997). ASORA’s registration provisions, which require initial registration in 
person and subsequent registration, are less burdensome than the New York requirements. Thus, 
registration in person docs not make an otherwise regulatory statute punitive.
Like the Washington statute, ASORA’s registration provisions neither restrict the 
offenders’ geographic mobility, nor impose excessively burdensome registration requirements. 
The information requested from Alaska sex offenders is strictly biographical, and the registration 
requirements do not force the offender to continue living at the same address. ASORA is similar 
«to the Washington statute in simply monitoring the whereabouts of sex offenders, rather than 
imposing punishment.
The text of ASORA’s notification provisions also reveals no punitive legislative intent. 
The Act provides that sex offender infonnation can be released to the public through an Internet
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rcgistr>' mainiaincd by the Alaska Dcparlment ofPublic Safety. Alaska Slat. § 18.65.087 (1994). 
While the text of this notification requirement does not explicitly state that releasing sex offender 
infomialion is necessary to public safely as does the Washington statute, the intent to protect the 
public is implicit in the ASORA legislative findings. 1994 Alaska Sess. L. 41, § 1. The 
legislative history provides that “release of certain information about sex offenders to public 
agencies and the general public will assist in protecting public safety." Id. ASORA’s 
notification provisions deliberately omit any legislative intent to punish sex offenders through 
public ostracism or stigma. This omission, coupled with the express legislative history that 
emphasized public safety, suggests that the ASORA notification scheme is an administrative 
measure designed to infomi the public about the release of former sex offenders into the local 
community.
3. Similar sex offender registration laws in other states have been held to be 
primarily non-punitive. regulatory schemes.
Several recent federal circuit decisions upheld statutes similar to ASORA as regulator>% 
non-punilivc measures. Cutshall. 193 F.3d at 477; Vemiero. 119 F.3d at 1081; Femedeer, 227 
}- .3d at 1253. In C utshall, the court analyzed a Tennessee statute that required sex offenders to 
pro\ idc the same registration information as the ASORA except for the photograph and 
fingerprints, and required sex offenders to register with local police agencies within ten days of 
release from prison. 193 F.3d at 470. The Sixth Circuit held that the registration law sought to 
monitor the whereabouts of convicted sex offenders, without limiting their geographic mobility 
or requiring them to supply more than basic biographical information. M. at 474. The Cutshall 
court reasoned that the statute did not punish registrants because it did not limit their actions, and 
because registering required little effort and inconvenience. Id.
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ASORA's rcgislralion requirements are similar to the Tennessee registration scheme.
The Act does not restrict the sex offender's movements, and the required registration information 
is minimal and non-burdensome. Arguably. Tennessee's requirement to register within ten days 
is more onerous than the duty to register within thirty days of release from custody under 
ASORA. Thus, ASORA's registration requirements arc designed to monitor the physical 
whereabouts of former sex offenders and not to punish them with excessive registration duties.
The Sixth and Tenth Circuits also respectively upheld Tennessee and Utah’s notification 
provisions on grounds that public disclosure of sex offender information occurred only when it 
was necessary for public safety. Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 474; Fcmcdeer, 227 F.3d at 1247-48. In 
Femedeer, the Tenth Circuit held that Utah’s notification provisions did not evidence a puniti\ c 
legislative intent, reasoning that the statute facilitated investigation of scx-rclated crimes. 227 
F.3d at 1249. The court also emphasized the administrative advantages of disclosing the registry 
infomiation on the Internet. Id. Similarly, the Cutshall court also stressed that disclosure of sex 
offender registration information was limited to instances where public safety was at stake. 193 
F.3d at 474. Such limited disclosure provisions were additional evidence that the legislature did 
not intend the statute to be punitive. Id Finally, the Russell court also concluded that the 
Washington notification provisions properly authorized limited public access to sex offender 
information. 124 F.3d at 1090. The court emphasized that the goal of the notification scheme 
was to aid local law enforcement and the general public to prepare for the release of dangerous 
sex offenders into the local communities. Id. According to the court, limited access to the 
relevant registry- infomiation online would help the local public guard against potential 
recidivism. Id.
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ASORA’s nolificaiion provisions are similar lo Utah, Tennessee, and Washington's 
notification schemes. Like the above three statutes, the Alaska Department of Public Safety 
must provide sex offender registration information to the public in an effort lo protect the public 
from recidivist sex offenders. 1994 Alaska Sess. L. 41, § 1. The legislative history specifies that 
recidivist sex offenders pose a risk to the public, and that local enforcement agencies and the 
public will benefit from the release of infomiation about sex offenders into the community. 1994 
Alaska Sess. L. 41, § 1. 'fhese goals arc not embodied in the text of ASORA’s notification 
provisions, but the non-punili\’e legislative purpose of the statute can be inferred. The Alaska 
leuislalure did not cmphasi/.c other legislative goals, such as deterring convicted sex offenders 
Irorn future sex crimes or punishing former sex offenders through public ostracism and 
embarrassment in the language of the Act.
The courts in Cmshi^, Fcmcdeer, and Russell, concluded that their states’ notification 
requirements were necessary lo ensure public safety. 193 F.3d at 474; 227 F.3d at 1247-48; 124 
I- .3d at 1090. The same can be said about the ASORA notification scheme, because the 
rciiistralion information is disseminated to the public in an effort to inform local public safety 
agencies and the local community about the release of potentially dangerous sex offenders. 
Patterson, 985 P.2d at 1011; Ottc, 259 F.3d at 986.
4. Inclusion of ASORA provisions in Alaska Code of Criminal Procedure is 
based on practical considerations.
This Court has repeatedly approved the imposition of civil remedies following criminal 
pro.sccutions, even where the statute authorizing the civil remedy was included in the same 
statute as the underlying criminal offense. See e.g. United States v. One Assortment of 89 
J ir^mrns, 465 U.S. 354 (1984). The codification of ASORA in Alaska’s criminal code is not 
sufficient proof of the legislature’s punitive intent. Otte, 259 F.3d at 986. The Washington
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statute in Russell was also included in the stale's criminal code, however - given the lcgislaii\ e
findings and history, the court held that the legislature acted with a non-punilive inieni. 124 F.3l1 
at 1090. ASORA’s placement in the stale’s criminal code is insufficient to show a punitive 
legislative intent because the legislature’s decision was also motivated by administrative 
considerations.
B. Respondents Have Not Shown by Clearest ProofThat ASORA Has an Overall
Punitive Effect.
Only the clearest proof of punitive effect will be sufficient to override non-punitivc
legislative intent and transform an otherwise civil measure into a criminal penalty. Hudson v.
United States, 522 U.S. 93, 101 (1997). This Court developed a seven-part balancing test to
detennine whether a challenging party has established by clearest proof that a sex offender
registration law’s punitive effects outweigh the non-punitivc legislative intent. Mendo/.a-
Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168. Under this test, the court considers w'hcther:
(1) the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, (2) it has historically been 
regarded as a punishment, (3) whether it comes into play only on a finding ofscicnier, (4) 
whether its operation w ill promote the traditional aims of punishment - retribution and 
deterrence, (5) w'hether the behavior to wiiich it applies is already a crime, (6) whether an 
alternative purpose to w'hich it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, (7) and 
whether it appears excessive in relation to the allcmalive purpose assigned.
Id. None of the above factors is considered dispositive. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 101.
1. ASORA’s registration and notification requirements do not deprive
registrants of any affirmative rights because the Act docs not restrict the 
offenders’ geographic mobility, employment or housing opportunities.
Whether a particular sanction results in an affirmative disability or restraint similar to
traditional punishment depends on its nature. ASORA’s registration procedures do not
create an affirmative disability or restraint in the traditional sense that punishment docs. The Act
docs not restrict the registrants’ geographic movement, narrow' their housing search, or deny
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ihcm employment opporlunilics. Femcdecr> 227 F.3d at 1250. The release of certain 
information to the Department of Public Safety and registration in person on a quarterly basis 
does not deprive former sex offenders of any present rights.
In Hudson, this Court held that a monetary fine, coupled with an indefinite debamient 
from the banking industry did not rise to the level of an affirmative disability or restraint, and did 
not approach the “infamous punishment of imprisonment.” 522 U.S. at 104. The Hudson court 
reasoned that revoking privileges that were voluntarily granted or requiring payments of specific 
sums of money has been historically viewed as enforceable civil sanctions since the original 
revenue laws of 1789. \± In light of this Court's focus on the historical characteristics of 
particular legislative measures, the Ninth Circuit’s emphasis on the ASORA’s “onerous” 
registration conditions seems misplaced. Otte. 259 F.3d at 987. ASORA’s registration 
requirements arc significantly less severe than a monetary sanction or an express restriction on 
seeking employment that this Court considered in Hudson. 522 U.S. at 104. Moreover, 
registration is administrative in nature, and is analogous to the affimiative steps required for 
receiving a driver license, passport, or traveling visa.
Similarly, notification procedures which do not expressly limit sex offenders from 
pursuing particular employment or prohibit seeking housing in a particular geographic area, do 
not deprive sex offenders of any affirmative rights. Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1250. The Femedeer, 
court held that Utah’s state notification scheme, which allowed unlimited Internet access to the 
complete sex registry information to any person, regardless of residence or specific need, did not 
result in an affirmative restraint or disability. Id. The court reasoned that notification by itself 
docs not prohibit sex offenders from pursuing employment available to other members of the 
public. Id The Sixth Circuit in Cutshall also concluded that public notification requirements are
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far from analogous to imprisonment and do not restrict the registrant in any affinnativc \va\-.
193 F.3d at 474.
Alaska’s notification approach is most analogous to Utah’s. Like the Utah statute, 
ASORA permits widespread Internet dissemination of sex offender registration infonnation 
regardless of the risk a particular offender presents, or the punwse of the public inquir\'.
However, because ASORA does not explicitly deprive fomier sex offenders from particular 
employment or housing opportunities that other members of the public enjoy, there is no 
affirmative punishment in the traditional sense. The fact that employers could potentially 
deprive former sex offenders of work opportunities, or that the public could ostrasi/.e the 
registrants is not equivalent to imposing an affirmative punishment. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104.
The Ninth Circuit’s argument that ASORA’s broad notification procedures will make it 
practically impossible for registrants to find employment and subject sex offenders to public 
stigma has several flaws. Otte, 259 F.3d 987. The court argued that ASORA analogized 
ASORA with an affirmative notification scheme that authorizes public inspection of police 
records and allows newspapers and others to disseminate sex offender registration infonnation.
M:
ASORA’s notification procedures, however, result in less of a practical disability to sex 
offenders because Internet notice is inherently passive. For instance, under Washington’s 
notification scheme, which authorizes disclosure only when necessary for public protection and 
within the local geographic area, the local agencies have an affinnativc obligation to infonn all 
local residents about the release of sex offenders from custody. Wash. Rev. Code §4.24.550( 1 )- 
(5) (2002). Receiving such direct notice puts registered sex offenders at a much more immediate 
disadvantage because local employers and landlords will receive infonnation about them.
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A
regardless of whether they actually requested it. Passive Internet notice under ASOR.^ can 
actually result in less burdensome for registrants because there is no evidence to suggest that 
persons other than those residing in the local communities might be interested in viewing the sex 
offender registry on the Internet, even if it is widely available. Additionally, there is no evidence 
in the record that widespread publication of the registry on the Internet actually resulted in the 
loss of specific employment or housing opportunities to the respondents.
Because ASORA administrative registration provisions do not deprive the registrants of 
ability to move geographically, and do not deny them any affirmative rights, the Act docs not 
result in an affimiativc disability to the respondents. Furthermore, ASORA’s public disclosure 
requirements do not cause the registrants to forego concrete employment or housing 
opportunities, and there is no evidence that unlimited public disclosure on the Internet results in a 
greater burden than door-to-door targeted notification.
2. Sex offender registration and notification schemes have traditionally been 
viewed as regulatory measures because accurate disclosure of the 
offenders’ criminal records does not amount to punishment.
Most federal circuits agree that sex offender registration and notification statutes have not 
been typically regarded as punishment. Vemiero, 119 F.3d at 1099-1100, Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 
1251, Ottc, 259 F.3d at 989. While public dissemination of sex offender registration information 
may seem like public shaming, ostracism, and humiliation amounting to punishment, it is 
nothing more than accurate disclosure of information about convicted sex offenders’ past 
criminal activities. Vemiero, 119 F.3d at 1099-1100. This information is also available to the 
general population through the public trial and indictment of the registrant. Id. The 
dissemination of crime-related infomiation in furtherance of legitimate government interests has 
traditionally not been regarded as punishment. Id. The Tenth Circuit stressed that passive
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disclosure of registry infonnalion on the Intcmcl is not equivalent to widespread public shaming, 
and that the Internet is merely a technological extension ofthc government's historical efforts to 
publicize information about criminal offenses. Fcmedeer, 227 F.3d at 1251.
Historically, punishment has entailed incarceration, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. 
Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 475-76. Public shaming involves more than a simple dissemination of 
infomiation about a particular person: there is usually a physical removal from the community or 
physical display of the person before fellow citizens. Vcmiero, 119 F.3d at 1099-1100. ASORA 
imposes no such punishments on foraicr sex offenders because Intcmcl access to registry 
information does not publicly humiliate them in the sense that physical banishment or 
incarceration does.
3. ASORA’s operation docs not depend on a finding of scienter because it 
also applies in other circumstances.
Under this Court’s analysis in Hudson, the relevant question with respect to the third 
Mendoza-Martinez factor is whether the sex registration and notification act’s requirements turn 
only on a finding of scienter. 522 U.S. at 104. ASORA’s application does not turn “only" on the 
finding of scienter because it applies in other circumstances as well. Oue, 259 F.3d at 989. The 
act applies to certain strict liability sex offences, such as sexual abuse of a minor under thirteen 
years old without any showing of knowledge of the victim’s age on defendant’s part. Alaska 
Stat. §§ 11.41.434, 11.41.445(b) (1994). Accordingly, ASORA's application does not require a 
prior finding of scienter.
4. ASORA lacks a retributive effect, even if it has incidental deterrent 
effects because the Alaska legislature docs not chastise or 
discipline former sex offenders.
The fact that a regulatory registration scheme has a potential dclcrrcnl effect does not 
automatically render it a punitive measure. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361. For a state legislative
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aclion to be deemed retributive, the law must amount to a deliberate chastising or disciplinary'
measure. Kellcv. %l h'. Supp. at 1111. Because the ASORA does not conclusively satisfy 
cither of the above two tests, its overall effect is not to promote criminal goals of deterrence and 
retribution.
a. ASORA is primarily a regulatory' civil scheme, and its criminal 
deterrent effects are incidental.
ASORA’s substantial registration provisions may promote deterrence by discouraging 
potential offenders from committing sex crimes in an effort to escape the statute’s requirements. 
However, this Court cautioned in Ursery that a statute’s deterrent effect does not necessarily 
prove that the sanction is strictly criminal in nature. 518 U.S. at 292. Deterrence can serve 
criminal, as well as civil goals. Ursery, 518 U.S. at 292. ASORA also promotes the legitimate 
civil goals of protecting the public from sexual offender recidivism and aiding local law 
enforcement in investigating sex crimes.
Moreover, a registration’s deterrent effect does not necessarily render an otherwise 
regulatory scheme punitive. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361. For example, tort law deters certain 
aclion by imposing monetary damages on those who violate it. Id. However, the underlying 
purpose of tort law' is not to impose criminal punishment on certain conduct. Bennis v. 
Michigan, 516 U.S. 442. 452 (1996).
Finally, ASORA’s notification procedures may not result in deterrence at all. ASORA 
provides for passive public disclosure of the sex offender registry on the Internet, rather than 
•affirmative notification within a narrow geographic area, as under the Washington statute.
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b. Respondents did not present any evidence of a deliberate lc^islati\ c 
intent to discipline former sex offenders.
For a sanction to be considered retributive, it must directly chastise, deter, or discipline 
the individual. Kelley, 961 F. Supp. at 1111. ASORA merely requires ongoing administrative 
registration, but it does not chastise or discipline fomier sex offenders the way incarceration 
does. Moreover, the primar>’ purpose of the Act is to protect the public, rather than deter future 
crime. 1994 Alaska Sess. L. 41, § 1.
Retribution also requires that the law affix culpability based on prior conduct and that the 
application of the law turn on a finding of scienter. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 362. ASORA's 
notification provisions do not make the fomier sex offender more culpable simply by publicizing 
registry infomialion to the public, nor do they necessarily depend on a finding of scienter.
5. ASORA punishes fomier sex offenders only for failure to register under 
the Act, but does not create a new offense which includes prior conviction 
as an element.
ASORA applies only to convicted sex offenders. Alaska Stat. § 12.63.100(5) (1994). 
However, the Act does not create a new offense based on the prior conviction; the Act only 
creates a duty to register. Alaska Stat. § 12.63.010(b). Failure to register under ASORA 
constitutes a separate offense, and because the Act’s punishment for failure to register takes 
place after the initial conviction, there is no retroactive punishment. Russell, 124 F.3d at 108S- 
89.
6. ASORA has a valid and logical alternative purpose of protecting the
* public.
As the respondents conceded below, there is a rational, legitimate, and logical purpose 
behind ASORA - protection of the public from the risk of re-offense by sex offenders. Otte. 259 
F.3d at 991. The legislative findings expressly stale the need to protect the public from recidivist
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sex offenders, and the bencfil of distributing infonnation about sex offenders to the local public 
and law enforcentent in ensuring public safety. 1994 Alaska Sess. L. 41, § 1. Because the text 
of ASORA is silent as to any additional legislative goals, the logical conclusion is that the 
Alaska legislature wanted to protect the public in enacting its registration and notification 
scheme.
7. ASORA’s registration and notification procedures are not excessive in 
light of the government’s goal of protecting the public.
Whether the sanction is excessive depends on the alternative purpose behind it. Hudson, 
522 U.S. at 99-100. Given Alaska’s legislative findings and its goal of protecting the public 
from recidivist sex offenders. ASORA's registration requirements are not overly burdensome. 
ASORA does not deprive registrants of specific housing or employment opportunities, but 
merely collects essential biographical and conviction infonnation to aid law enforcement in the 
prevention of future sex crimes.
ASORA’s notification provisions are identical to Utah's, which were not found to be 
excessive in light of the goal of ensuring public safety. Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1253. The Tenth 
Circuit explained that although sex offender registr>' infonnation will be globally available on 
the Internet, it will not necessarily be accessed more frequently. Id The court reasoned that 
persons outside Utah's jurisdiction will not have an interest in its sex offender registry, and the 
widespread availability of sex offender information will be partially negated by the decreased 
likelihood of actual public viewing of the website. Id.
•• The same rationale applies to ASORA. Even though the Act permits unrestricted public 
dissemination via the Internet, the probability that employers, landlords, or the general public 
outside of Alaska local communities will access the information is low'. ASORA’s main purpose 
is to protect the local public from sex crimes by convicted sex offenders. The fact that registry
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information is widely available on the Internet docs not necessarily make the disclosure 
excessive because Alaskan sex offenders do not pose a significant threat to a resident of New 
York or California. Out-of-stalc persons are not likely to access the ASORA Internet rcuistrv 
thus - ASORA registrants will not suffer the increased public shame from widespread vicwiivT
Also, elevating the single cxccssiveness factor to dispositive status is inappropriate within 
the effects analysis. Hudson, 521 U.S. at 302; Mendoza-Martinc/., 372 U.S. at 169. In Hudson 
this Court explained that in detemtining whether a sanction is primarily civil or criminal, the 
analysis should balance all of the relevant factors, rather than focus on whether the burden 
imposed was grossly disproportionate to the alternative legislative purt^osc. 521 U.S. at 362.
In this case, the Ninth Circuit stressed that the cxcessivcncss factor was “hidily 
significant,” and should be given “substantial weight.” Otte, 259 F.3d at 991. Coupled with the 
court's determination that ASORA resulted in an affimiative disability to the registrants, the 
court was able to accord more weight to the cxcessivcncss factor. Id at 994. However, this 
Court in Hudson, stressed that none of the Mendoza-Martinez factors are determinative in the 
analysis of the punitive effect of the legislative scheme. 521 U.S. at 362.
Hudson raises the legitimate implication that each of the seven factors should be 
accorded equal weight in the analysis. Id. On its face, ASORA requires widespread 
dissemination of registry infomiation for public protection. Because Internet notification is 
inherently passive and untargeted, and because the Alaska legislature had an altcmative goal of
ensuring public safety, the notification requirements of the Act arc not grossly disproportionate
••
to its legislative purpose.
ASORA is not punitive in effect or intent. The legislative findings and overall design of 
ASORA, as well as the treatment of similar registration and notification statutes in other circuits
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demonstrate that the Alaska legislature lacked a punitive intent in enacting the Act. Moreoever. 
the overall effect of ASORA is non-punitivc. ASOR.A can be rationally characterized as 
primarily a civil, regulatory scheme designed to protect the public, improve crime investigation, 
and equip local law enforcement with a \ aluable sex offender database. There is no evidence 
that ASORA deprives registrants of specific employment or housing opportunities, or creates a 
significant deterrent effect. The excessiveness of the registration and notification requirements is 
questionable, given the untargeted nature of wide-spread Internet notification and the lack of 
incentives for the overall public to access a sex offender registry' intended primarily for the local 
.•\laska communities.
The legislative history of ASORA indicates a lack of a legislative punitive intent in 
enacting the Alaska sex offender registration and notification scheme. Moreover, the Mendoza- 
Martinez balancing suggests that .ASORA docs not have an overall punitive effect.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, petitioners respectfully request that this Court REVERSE the 
judgment of the Lhiiled States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on the due process claim. 
.Additionally, petitioner prays that this Court REVERSE the judgment of the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals as to the ex post factor claim.
Counsel for Petitioners
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